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Nonconsensual Pornography and the First 
Amendment: A Case for a New Unprotected 
Category of Speech 
ALIX IRIS COHEN* 
Nonconsensual pornography, or the distribution of sexually 
graphic images of individuals without their consent, is not 
illegal at the federal level, nor is it illegal in the majority of 
states. Failure to pass laws prohibiting nonconsensual por-
nography, commonly referred to as “revenge porn,” leaves 
many victims without recourse. Opponents of legislation 
regulating revenge porn claim that it cannot be banned be-
cause it constitutes speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment. This Comment argues that nonconsensual por-
nography should be considered an unprotected category of 
speech, which would enable it to be prohibited without trig-
gering First Amendment concerns. The method of regulating 
revenge porn (i.e., through particular torts or criminal pro-
hibitions) is beyond the scope of this Comment; instead, it 
focuses on why this speech should be unprotected, opening 
the door for legislatures to regulate it as they see fit. 
Nonconsensual pornography should not be protected by the 
First Amendment because of its similarities to existing un-
protected categories of speech: namely, public disclosure of 
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private fact, defamation, and child pornography. Part I pre-
sents the three theories often articulated for why the First 
Amendment protects speech: to create a marketplace of 
ideas, facilitate participatory democracy, and promote indi-
vidual autonomy. Part II explains why certain types of 
speech are unprotected: because their minimal value to-
wards advancing these free speech goals is outweighed by 
the significant harm they cause. Part III discusses three cur-
rent unprotected categories: public disclosure of private 
fact, defamation, and child pornography. For each, it ex-
plains why they have been found to be unprotected - balanc-
ing their contribution to promoting free speech values 
against the harms they cause. Part IV argues for revenge 
porn as a new unprotected category, first defining the pa-
rameters of the category, discussing what the category 
should encompass in order to ensure it is not overbroad. It 
then highlights nonconsensual pornography’s low free 
speech value and analogous harms to the existing three cat-
egories—showing it is indistinguishable from speech that 
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INTRODUCTION 
A human trafficking victim testified that her former pimp, Alex 
Campbell, forced her to have sex with another woman while he vid-
eotaped her and then threatened to send the video to her family if 
she did not “come back into his grasp.”1 A high school teacher’s ex-
boyfriend allegedly accessed his email account and sent naked pho-
tos of the teacher to 287 of his students and staff after the two broke 
up.2 A woman’s ex-boyfriend posted a topless photo of her on her 
employer’s Facebook page, accompanied by a message calling her 
a “drunk” and a “slut.”3 
While each of these perpetrators may be prosecuted on other 
grounds (i.e., for human trafficking),4 the underlying act—the dis-
tribution of nonconsensual pornography—is not illegal in many 
states.5 Failure to pass laws prohibiting nonconsensual pornography 
leaves many victims without recourse.6 Nonconsensual pornogra-
phy, often referred to as revenge porn (used interchangeably 
                                                                                                             
 1 Marion Brooks, The World of Human Trafficking: One Woman’s Story, 
NBC CHICAGO (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/hu-
man-trafficking-alex-campbell-192415731.html. 
 2 Andy Campbell, Jilted Ex-Boyfriend Sends Nude Photos of Teacher To 
Students, Staff: Police, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2014/11/04/richard-rosa-david-galvan_n_6099464.html. 
 3 Office of the City Attorney for the City of Los Angeles, Press Release: 
City Attorney Feuer Secures Conviction Under State’s “Revenge Porn” Law 
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://freepdfhosting.com/b9b7570cb1.pdf. 
 4 See Brooks, supra note 1. 
 5 See Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: A 
Guide for Legislators, ENDREVENGEPORN.ORG (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/main_2013/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Guide-
for-Legislators_7-18-14.pdf. 
 6 See, e.g., Erin Donaghue, Judge Throws Out New York ‘Revenge Porn’ 
Case, CBS NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-throws-
out-new-york-revenge-porn-case/ (New York judge ruled that a man who posted 
nude photos of his ex-girlfriend on Twitter and sent them to her employer and 
sister, allegedly without the woman’s consent, did not violate any existing crimi-
nal law); see also Amanda L. Cecil, Taking Back the Internet: Imposing Civil 
Liability on Interactive Computer Services in an Attempt to Provide an Adequate 
Remedy to Victims of Nonconsensual Pornography, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2513, 2517 (2014) (Court of Appeals of Texas held class action suit against web-
hosting company for displaying nude images of women on one of their web sites 
without the women’s consent should be dismissed because publishing images 
taken by a third party is not illegal); see also Annmarie Chiarini, I Was a Victim 
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throughout this Comment), is the “distribution of sexually graphic 
images of individuals without their consent.”7 The images include 
those originally taken without consent and those initially taken with 
consent—most often within a private relationship—and then distrib-
uted to others without consent.8 Revenge porn is commonly posted 
online by “ex-boyfriends, ex-husbands and ex-lovers, often accom-
panied by disparaging descriptions and identifying details, like 
where the women live and work, as well as links to their Facebook 
pages.”9 Once online, the images spread—often “picked up by doz-
ens or even hundreds of other Web sites.”10 These images, exposing 
individuals’ most private aspects of themselves, are often published 
to perpetrate abuse, to embarrass, or to shame.11 
While prior to 2013, only three states—New Jersey, Alaska, and 
Texas—had laws criminalizing nonconsensual pornography, ten 
states passed laws in 2013 and 2014, and legislation has been intro-
duced or is pending in eighteen other states, as well as in Washing-
ton D.C. and Puerto Rico.12 However, many state proposals and fed-
eral legislation have faced opposition from critics arguing that such 
laws infringe on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s pro-
tection of free speech.13 A bill addressing the issue in Florida, for 
                                                                                                             
of Revenge Porn. I Don’t Want Anyone Else to Face This, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/revenge-
porn-victim-maryland-law-change (When Chiarini’s ex-boyfriend auctioned a 
CD of 88 naked images of her on eBay without her consent, the Baltimore County 
police told her there was nothing they could do because “[n]o crime had been 
committed.”). 
 7 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Erica Goode, Victims Push Laws to End Online Revenge Posts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/victims-push-laws-to-
end-online-revenge-posts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 1–3. 
 12 As of the time this Comment was written. Franks, supra note 5, at 2. 
 13 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech. . . .”); see also Erin Fuchs, Here’s What the Constitution Says 
About Posting Naked Pictures of Your Ex To The Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 1, 
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/is-revenge-porn-protected-by-the-first-
amendment-2013-9; Steven Nelson, Federal ‘Revenge Porn’ Bill Will Seek to 
Shrivel Booming Internet Fad, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.us-
news.com/news/articles/2014/03/26/federal-revenge-porn-bill-will-seek-to-
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instance, failed in the state’s legislature in 2013, in part because of 
First Amendment concerns.14 Under the First Amendment, speech 
is not limited to spoken words, but also covers other forms of ex-
pression—including images.15 Thus, laws that ban or criminalize the 
distribution of images may raise free speech questions. 
This Comment argues that nonconsensual pornography should 
be considered an unprotected category of speech, which would en-
able it to be prohibited without triggering First Amendment con-
cerns.16 The method of regulating nonconsensual pornography (i.e., 
through particular torts or criminal prohibitions) is beyond the scope 
of this Comment; instead, this Comment focuses on why noncon-
sensual pornography should be unprotected, opening the door for 
legislatures to regulate it as they see fit. 
Arguably, distributing nonconsensual pornography should be 
considered conduct, not speech, because nonconsensual pornogra-
phy is generally disseminated to cause harm, rather than to express 
an idea.17 Moreover, there are many laws regulating conduct that 
may be considered speech, but are not thought to trigger the First 
Amendment—i.e., perjury, extortion, placing bets, etc.18 However, 
assuming nonconsensual pornography (as defined above) is speech, 
                                                                                                             
shrivel-booming-internet-fad (revealing that commentators claim federal legisla-
tion introduced to criminalize online dissemination of nonconsensual pornogra-
phy raises First Amendment issues). 
 14 Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression: Legislative 
Pushback to an Online Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 693–94 (2014). 
 15 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 
DUKE L.J. 589, 594 (noting that adult pornography is generally considered pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause). 
 16 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1971) (explaining that if a 
category of speech is established as unprotected, it can be regulated without regard 
to the First Amendment). 
 17 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (Conduct is con-
sidered speech covered by the First Amendment if the speaker intends to convey 
a particular message, and “in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”). If the dis-
tributor’s intent is to harm, it is not necessarily to convey a message, nor neces-
sarily understood by viewers as conveying a message. 
 18 Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three 
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270 (1981). 
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it should be unprotected by the First Amendment because of its sim-
ilarities to existing unprotected categories of speech: namely, public 
disclosure of private fact,19 defamation,20 and child pornography.21 
Part I presents the three theories often articulated for why the 
First Amendment protects speech: to create a marketplace of ideas, 
facilitate participatory democracy, and promote individual auton-
omy. Part II explains why certain types of speech are unprotected: 
because their minimal value towards advancing these free speech 
goals is outweighed by the significant harm they cause. Part III dis-
cusses three current unprotected categories: public disclosure of pri-
vate fact, defamation, and child pornography. For each, it explains 
why they have been found to be unprotected—balancing their con-
tribution to promoting free speech values against the harms they 
cause. Part IV argues for revenge porn as a new unprotected cate-
gory, first defining the parameters of the category and discussing 
what the category should encompass in order to ensure it is not 
overly broad.22 It then highlights nonconsensual pornography’s low 
free speech value and analogous harms to the existing three catego-
ries—showing it is indistinguishable from speech that has already 
been deemed unprotected. 
I. WHY SPEECH IS PROTECTED 
There are three predominant theories for why freedom of speech 
is protected under the First Amendment: (1) to create a marketplace 
                                                                                                             
 19 Publication of Private Facts, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, 
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/publication-private-facts (last visited July 29, 
2015). 
 20 Frequently Asked Questions—Speech, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faq/frequently-asked-questions-speech 
(last visited July 29, 2015). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Some revenge porn laws go too far in infringing upon speech. See, e.g., 
First Amendment Lawsuit Challenges Arizona Criminal Law Banning Nude Im-
ages, ACLU (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/first-amend-
ment-lawsuit-challenges-arizona-criminal-law-banning-nude-images (A coali-
tion of bookstores, news media, librarians, and photographers challenged an Ari-
zona “nude photo law” for being overbroad in criminalizing speech protected by 
the First Amendment.). However, a narrow range of nonconsensual pornography 
should be considered unprotected speech in order to allow for criminal or civil 
legal remedies for nonconsensual pornography victims. 
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of ideas; (2) to enhance participatory democracy; and (3) to promote 
individual autonomy and self-expression.23 While some may be em-
phasized in certain cases over others, all three have been used by the 
Supreme Court to justify the protection of speech.24 
A. Marketplace of Ideas 
Justice Holmes wrote, “the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket. . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”25 This 
articulates the theory that by protecting freedom of speech, the Con-
stitution fosters a marketplace of ideas by allowing different view-
points to be expressed.26 Doing so promotes the search for truth be-
cause there is a greater change that the truth will be revealed if dif-
ferent ideas are expressed.27 
Under this theory, false ideas are useful because by challenging 
true ideas, they encourage re-examination of the truth, strengthening 
and vitalizing the truth.28 Discussion of both true and false ideas is 
necessary to discover which the falsities are; thus, “the remedy to be 
applied [to overcome falsehood] is more speech, not enforced si-
lence.”29 
The marketplace of ideas theory has been criticized because in 
reality, truth does not always prevail over falsehood.30 For instance, 
inequality among communicators in the marketplace of ideas—i.e., 
the fact that social and economic power largely determine who has 
control of channels of communication—affects what messages are 
heard.31 In addition, people’s tendency to interpret information in a 
                                                                                                             
 23 Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Lis-
tening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 966 (2009). 
 24 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24–26 (alluding to all three theories as reasons for 
finding that wearing a jacket stating “Fuck the draft” is protected speech). 
 25 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
 26 See id. 
 27 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964). 
 28 See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 
130 (1989). 
 29 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 30 See Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 132–34. 
 31 See id. at 134. 
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way that conforms with social convention or serves individuals’ in-
terests or unconscious desires may color their understanding of 
truth.32 
However, the alternative to protecting a free marketplace of 
ideas is regulation by the government. Giving the state power to 
control which ideas are heard sparks the fear underlying the Free 
Speech Clause: that government regulation will be driven by a desire 
of those in power to only allow dissemination of ideas in support of 
themselves and the policies they favor (contrary to promoting par-
ticipatory democracy, discussed below).33 Indeed, “it is largely be-
cause governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in 
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so 
largely to the individual.”34 
B. Participatory Democracy 
Freedom of speech facilitates democratic government in at least 
two ways: (1) it makes having an informed electorate possible by 
ensuring access to information; and (2) it encourages participation 
in the democratic process by enabling people to express their polit-
ical views.35 
First, because in a democracy the electorate votes government 
officials into power, citizens need as much information as possible 
to elect the best-suited political officials.36 Free speech enables the 
media to report a wide variety of viewpoints on political candidates 
and public affairs, including “vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”37 This 
facilitates democracy by providing the electorate with information 
and different opinions on the government, in order for it to effec-
tively assess candidates’ performances.38 
                                                                                                             
 32 Id. at 134–35. 
 33 Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 632 (2004). 
 34 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
 35 Corbin, supra note 23, at 969. 
 36 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 
596 (1982). 
 37 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (limiting the 
scope of defamation against public officials to protect the media’s ability to con-
tribute to “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate). 
 38 See Redish, supra note 36, at 596. 
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Second, protecting speech encourages participation in the dem-
ocratic process by enabling people to voice their own opinions about 
their government and political officials, even if those opinions are 
critical.39 Democracy is based not only on the election of political 
officials, but also on a culture of participation in government—often 
through speech regarding political affairs.40 The value of this dem-
ocratic culture is that “it gives ordinary people a say in the progress 
and development of the cultural forces that in turn produce them.”41 
Voicing ideas may also be influential in other people’s voting deci-
sions and in the legislature’s policy choices.42 
C. Individual Autonomy 
Because free speech affords people an opportunity to hear and 
consider different ideas as well as to voice their own opinions, it 
promotes autonomy.43 Autonomy “consists of a person’s authority 
(or right) to make decisions about herself . . . as long as her actions 
do not block others’ similar authority or rights.”44 The autonomy 
advanced by freedom of expression includes self-realization, or in-
dependent thought, and self-determination, or independent decision-
making.45 
First, self-realization refers “to development of the individual’s 
powers and abilities”—an individual’s power to realize his or her 
own potential.46 This is tied to free speech because people define 
themselves by expressing their thoughts through speech.47 For in-
stance, speech encompasses self-expressive rights, such as the right 
to persuade or associate with others, or on the contrary, to criticize 
                                                                                                             
 39 See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417–18 (1989) (upholding 
a right to burn the American flag as a form of free speech because it is expression 
of a particular political idea). 
 40 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Free-
dom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004). 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. at 35–36. 
 43 Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 143. 
 44 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 
254 (2011). 
 45 See Greenawalt, supra 28, at 143–44. 
 46 Redish, supra note 36, at 593. 
 47 See Baker, supra note 44, at 253–54. 
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or disassociate with others.48 These forms of expression help indi-
viduals define who they are based on who and what they like, as 
well as who and what they dislike.49 
Second, self-determination refers to “the individual’s control of 
his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions”—
an individual’s ability to achieve the life goals that he or she has 
set.50 The ability to think and speak freely enables individuals to 
make decisions autonomously, both because of the link between 
freedom of speech and freedom of thought,51 and because free 
speech ensures access to information needed for one to make in-
formed decisions.52 Government interference with freedom of 
speech denies individuals the right to hear an idea and deprives them 
of the ability to obtain information necessary for making indepen-
dent decisions.53 Thus, limiting free speech “interferes with free 
choice, and therefore with the exercise of autonomy.”54 
II. DETERMINING CATEGORIES OF UNPROTECTED SPEECH 
While these three theories underlying free speech are compel-
ling, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, like most con-
stitutional rights, is not absolute.55 If speech is protected under the 
First Amendment, and a state regulates it, the state regulation must 
be subjected to some type of heightened scrutiny.56 However, cer-
tain narrowly defined classes of speech are unprotected by the First 
                                                                                                             
 48 Id. at 254. 
 49 See id. 
 50 Redish, supra note 36, at 593. 
 51 Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 144–45. 
 52 See Balkin, supra note 40, at 36. 
 53 See Baker, supra note 44, at 254. 
 54 Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 150. 
 55 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 56 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a federal law prohibiting a particular type of lie because false state-
ments are protected speech under the First Amendment); contra Chaplinsky, 315 
U.S. at 573–74 (upholding a state law prohibiting “fighting words” without ap-
plying any kind of heightened scrutiny because such speech is unprotected). 
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Amendment because the “prevention and punishment of [such clas-
ses] has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”57  
Regulations restricting these types of speech are not subject to 
heightened scrutiny.58 These include obscenity, libel, and “fighting” 
words, for instance.59 
A. Balancing Test 
Determining whether speech is protected “involves weighing the 
free speech interests involved in a particular case against other coun-
tervailing interests, such as the public or state interests in order and 
security and the interests in deferring to legislative judgment.”60 Es-
sentially, courts weigh how much the type of speech contributes to 
free speech values against the harm the speech causes.61 If the harm 
caused is great, and the speech contributes only minimally to the 
underlying purposes of the First Amendment (creating a market-
place of ideas, facilitating participatory democracy, or advancing 
autonomy), it may be deemed an unprotected category.62 
For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme 
Court found “fighting words”—or words which “by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace”—to be an unprotected category of speech.63 Fighting words 
have minimal free speech value because they are personal epithets, 
not an “exposition of ideas” that contribute to the marketplace or to 
participatory democracy.64 While they may have slight value in 
                                                                                                             
 57 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. There is, however, one exception to the 
general rule that unprotected categories of speech do not raise constitutional con-
cerns: even if speech is unprotected, regulations of such speech cannot discrimi-
nate based on a specific viewpoint. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
383–91 (1992). 
 58 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–74. 
 59 Id. at 572. 
 60 Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: 
An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 
904 (1979). 
 61 See id. at 904–05. 
 62 See id. at 910–11. 
 63 315 U.S. at 572. 
 64 See id. The fighting words spoken by the appellant in this case, for exam-
ple, were “You are a God damned racketeer . . . a damned Fascist and the whole 
government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists . . . ” Id. at 569. 
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terms of autonomy of the speaker, who is expressing his or her ha-
tred or desire to attack the listener, they have no value for the auton-
omy of the listener, who is subjected to a personal insult.65 In addi-
tion, fighting words cause severe harm because by definition, they 
insult the listener and pose a safety risk to society, as they are likely 
to provoke retaliation, causing breach of the peace.66 
B. Reluctance to Declare New Categories 
Generally, pornography is protected speech to the extent that the 
sexually explicit images neither constitute obscenity nor child por-
nography.67 The question of whether nonconsensual pornography is 
protected speech, however, has not yet been before the Supreme 
Court. In Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression, Clay Calvert 
argues that the Supreme Court is unlikely to designate nonconsen-
sual pornography as a new category of unprotected speech, due to 
its reluctance to find new classes of speech unprotected in recent 
cases.68 In United States v. Stevens, Brown v. Entm’t Merchants 
Ass’n, and United States v. Alvarez, for instance, the Court declined 
to identify new categories of unprotected speech for depictions of 
animal cruelty, violent images directed at children, and lies, respec-
tively.69 
In Alvarez, the plurality took a slightly different approach to de-
termining unprotected categories. Rather than applying the tradi-
tional test—balancing the free speech benefits against the harms of 
the speech—the Court insisted on a historical analysis.70 Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “[b]efore exempting a category of speech from the 
normal prohibition on content-based restrictions . . . the Court must 
be presented with ‘persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on 
content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of 
                                                                                                             
 65 See id. at 572. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 594. 
 68 Calvert, supra note 14, at 683. 
 69 Id. at 683–84 (discussing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); 
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); United States v. Alvarez, 
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)). 
 70 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012). 
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proscription.’”71 Although, as Calvert writes, revenge porn is a “new 
form of expression for which there is no historical lack of protec-
tion,”72 its minimal benefits and severe harms closely parallel those 
of child pornography, defamation, and public disclosure of private 
fact—all of which are historically unprotected speech.73 
Moreover, nonconsensual pornography should be distinguished 
from false statements at issue in Alvarez because false statements 
were historically protected speech;74 revenge porn, however, did not 
exist prior to the invention of the Internet, the predominant tool used 
to distribute nonconsensual pornography. Thus, because revenge 
porn inherently is not part of a “tradition of proscription,” lack of 
historical roots should not prevent it from being identified as an un-
protected category.75 In addition, an originalist analysis should not 
be used for determining classes of unprotected speech because the 
Founders had a more limited view of the Free Speech Clause than 
the general view today.76 Nevertheless, even under a historical ap-
proach, revenge porn should not be precluded from being deemed 
unprotected because its similarities to historically unprotected 
speech make it more like a reconfiguration of existing categories, 
rather than an entirely new one.77 
                                                                                                             
 71 Id. (Kennedy, J., plurality) (finding false statements should not constitute 
a new category of unprotected speech on this historical basis) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 72 Calvert, supra note 14, at 684. 
 73 See Sheppard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography, and First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2007); Frequently 
Asked Questions—Speech, supra note 20; Publication of Private Facts, supra note 
19. 
 74 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547. 
 75 See id. at 2547. 
 76 Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in 
the United States, 76 FLA. B.J. 71, 71 (2002). The original understanding of the 
clause excepted broad categories of speech as not being protected, including 
speech that was “blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or 
scandalous libels.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 77 Nonconsensual pornography would likely be considered to fall within the 
scope of historically unprotected “immoral” or “scandalous” speech. See id. 
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III. CURRENT UNPROTECTED CATEGORIES OF SPEECH 
Nonconsensual pornography is closely analogous to three cur-
rent unprotected categories of speech: public disclosure of private 
fact, defamation, and child pornography.78 Like each of these classes 
of speech, discussed below, nonconsensual pornography should not 
be protected because it does not advance the marketplace of ideas, 
participatory democracy, or individual autonomy, and it causes sig-
nificant harm in many of the same ways these unprotected categories 
do. 
A. Public Disclosure of Private Fact 
1. DEFINITION 
Although the cause of action for public disclosure of private fact 
differs state by state, the elements of the tort generally include: (1) 
the public disclosure, (2) of a private fact, (3) that would be offen-
sive and objectionable to a reasonable person, and (4) that is not of 
legitimate public concern.79 Unlike defamation, public disclosure of 
private fact “does not rest upon the inaccuracy of the statement but 
upon the unwanted publicity” resulting from the statement.80 
a. Public Disclosure 
The disclosure of a private fact is public if the communication is 
made to a large or “potentially large” group of people.81 Public dis-
closure is considered to occur both when the communicator distrib-
utes the private information to the large group of people himself or 
herself, as well as when the communicator “merely initiates the pro-
cess whereby the information is eventually disclosed to a large num-
ber of persons.”82 The private fact may be disclosed through a vari-
ety of means, including oral or written communications, video, or 
still photographs.83 
                                                                                                             
 78 See Liu, supra note 73 at 2; Frequently Asked Questions—Speech, supra 
note 20; Publication of Private Facts, supra note 19. 
 79 Richard E. Kaye, Invasion of Privacy By Public Disclosure of Private 
Facts, 103 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 159, § 2 (2014). 
 80 Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1969). 
 81 Kaye, supra note 79, at § 3. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
2015] NONCONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 315 
 
For instance, in Kinsey v. Macur, the defendant, Macur, previ-
ously had a sexual relationship with the plaintiff, Kinsey, before 
Kinsey was married.84 After their relationship ended, Macur mailed 
several harassing letters to Kinsey, his new wife, and their acquain-
tances disclosing private facts concerning Kinsey’s character, in-
cluding that Kinsey had been accused of murdering his first wife, 
spent six months in jail for that crime, and had marijuana in his 
apartment.85 Although these letters were mailed to roughly twenty 
people, the court still held it was sufficient publicity to justify find-
ing the plaintiff’s privacy had been invaded.86 
In addition, although the plaintiff had shared most of the facts 
disclosed with Macur at some time, Macur’s publicizing these facts 
to about twenty others was still an invasion of privacy.87 The court 
noted, “much of the outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy 
is a reaction to exposure to persons known only through business or 
other secondary relationships. The claim is not so much one of total 
secrecy as it is the right to define one’s circle of intimacy.”88 In other 
words, it is not the number of people to whom the fact is disclosed 
that constitutes the primary harm, but the fact that the person whose 
privacy was invaded was unable to choose with whom the infor-
mation was shared.89 
b. Private Fact 
To be considered private, the facts disclosed must not already be 
a matter of public record; there must be some reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the facts.90 Facts that have previously been considered 
                                                                                                             
 84 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 609–610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 85 Id. at 610. Kinsey had in fact been charged with the murder of his first wife 
and spent six months awaiting trial, so these statements were not defamatory. See 
id. at 609. While Kinsey had disclosed the former two facts to Macur, he had not 
disclosed other facts in the letters (including those regarding his prior drug use) 
to Macur. Id. at 610. He concluded she found out about his marijuana possession 
by breaking into his apartment. Id. 
 86 Id. at 611–612. 
 87 See id. at 612. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. 
 90 Kaye, supra note 79, at § 4. 
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private include information about intimate parts of a person’s anat-
omy and images of sexual acts.91 
In Banks v. King Features Syndicate, for example, a woman’s 
doctors turned over a copy of an X-ray of her pelvic region—with-
out her consent—to a newspaper reporter.92 The reporter passed the 
X-ray picture to King Features Syndicate, Inc., which published an 
article about a medical issue afflicting the plaintiff.93 The article and 
X-ray were published in a newspaper and circulated throughout the 
U.S.94 No claim was made that the article or X-ray picture were 
false; however, by publishing the X-ray, which depicted details of 
the woman’s anatomy, her right to privacy was violated.95 
The court in Banks defined privacy as “the right of an individual 
to be let alone or to live a life of seclusion, or to be free from unwar-
ranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the 
public about matters with which the public is not necessarily con-
cerned.”96 Although the article was describing medical malpractice 
inflicted on the plaintiff—arguably an issue of public concern—the 
image of the most intimate details of her body was private.97 
Moreover, in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, the 
court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the dissemination 
of a videotape depicting famous rock star Bret Michaels and actress 
Pamela Anderson Lee engaging in sexual intercourse.98 The court 
stated that “distribution of the Tape on the Internet would constitute 
public disclosure,” and “the content of the Tape—Michaels and Lee 
engaged in sexual relations—constitutes a set of private facts,” the 
                                                                                                             
 91 See Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); 
see also Michaels v. Internet Ent. Grp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 92 Banks, 30 F. Supp. at 353. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. at 353–54. The court in Banks, however, deferred determination of 
the motion before it until trial because whether the act constituted a violation of 
the plaintiff’s right to privacy depended on state law. Id. at 354. Because the 
pleadings were ambiguous as to which state King Features “broke the seal of pri-
vacy and made public the plaintiff’s name and X-ray picture” in, it was unclear 
under which state’s law the defendant would be held liable. Id. 
 98 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
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disclosure of which “would be objectionable to a reasonable per-
son.”99 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that because 
Lee had appeared nude in magazines, movies, and publicly distrib-
uted videotapes, the content of the tape was no longer private.100 
“The fact that she has performed a role involving sex, does not, how-
ever, make her real sex life open to the public.”101 Furthermore, even 
though a different videotape disclosing sexual relations between Lee 
and her husband Tommy Lee had previously been made public, that 
disclosure did not justify disclosing a sex tape between Lee and 
Michaels: “Sexual relations are among the most personal and inti-
mate of acts. . . . public exposure of one sexual encounter [does not] 
forever remove[] a person’s privacy interest in all subsequent and 
previous sexual encounters.”102 
Although the plaintiffs in Michaels are public figures who threw 
themselves into the public spotlight by seeking fame, and therefore 
must tolerate some public exposure of their romantic involvement, 
the “visual and aural details of their sexual relations” are “facts 
which are ordinarily considered private even for celebrities.”103 This 
set of facts surrounding their intimate sexual relations remains pri-
vate—despite their chosen fame, and despite prior dissemination of 
a different sexual videotape featuring Lee.104 Thus, in determining 
whether public disclosure of private fact is unprotected speech, 
whether it is considered “private” turns not on the status of the fig-
ure, but on the nature of the fact.105 
                                                                                                             
 99 Id. at 840. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. Similar reasoning should apply to the nude photos of celebrities hacked 
in 2014. See Amanda Remling, iCloud Nude Leaks: 26 Celebrities Affected in the 
Nude Photo Scandal, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/icloud-nude-leaks-26-celebrities-affected-nude-photo-
scandal-1692540. 
 102 Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 840. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. 
318 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:300 
 
2. FREE SPEECH VALUE 
The private facts tort has been challenged on constitutional 
grounds for restricting speech protected under the First Amend-
ment.106 The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the con-
flict between the tort and the First Amendment, leaving the param-
eters of what speech is unprotected unclear.107 However, generally, 
if the private fact is not on a matter of public concern, it is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment.108 This rule, expressed in the fourth 
element of the tort—that the private facts must not be on a matter of 
“legitimate public concern”—indicates the minimal free speech 
value of this form of expression.109 
a. Marketplace of Ideas 
Courts have defined whether a private fact is of legitimate public 
interest based on whether it is “newsworthy,” or has some public 
importance.110 How newsworthiness is defined varies by jurisdic-
tion. In California, for example, there is a three-prong test that con-
siders “1) the social use of the published facts; 2) the extent of the 
article’s encroachment into seemingly private affairs; and 3) the ex-
tent to which the victim consented to a position of public fame.”111 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts approach, adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, provides that if “the publicity exceeds the 
community’s sense of decency,” it cannot be of legitimate public 
concern.112 In other words, “if a reasonable person would find the 
disclosed facts so indecent as to exceed the promulgation of infor-
mation to which the community is entitled, then that disclosure is 
not of legitimate public concern.”113 
                                                                                                             
 106 John A. Jurata, Jr., The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle 
Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 
498 (1999). 
 107 Id. at 498, 502. 
 108 See Whitney Kirsten McBride, Lock the Closet Door: Does Private Mean 
Secret?, 42 MCGEORGE L. Rev. 901, 914–15 (2011). 
 109 See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 2. 
 110 See McBride, supra note 108, at 914. 
 111 Jurata, supra note 106, at 506–07. 
 112 Id. at 502–03. 
 113 Id. at 503. 
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Under the California test, speech that discloses private facts con-
tributes little to the marketplace of ideas because the marketplace of 
ideas concerns discovery of broader societal truths, rather than inti-
mate details of an individual’s private life.114 Under the Restate-
ment’s “decency” test, exposure of an “indecent” fact also contrib-
utes little to the marketplace of ideas because it does not advance 
the discovery of any truth pertinent to the public interest, i.e. artistic, 
literary, academic, or political truth.115 
b. Participatory Democracy 
If a private fact does not relate to a legitimate public concern, 
which would include political candidates or public affairs, it is not 
“newsworthy” and is also unlikely to advance participatory democ-
racy.116 For instance, in Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Supreme Court 
held that a newspaper printing the name of a rape victim through a 
publicly released police report was in the public interest.117 The 
name was newsworthy because the information was about “a matter 
of public significance”—a crime report.118 
This protected speech, which makes some contribution to par-
ticipatory democracy by, for instance, showing crime levels under 
the current regime, stands in stark contrast to speech that has been 
determined not newsworthy—such as the sex tape in Michaels, 
which had essentially no impact on political affairs or any legitimate 
public value.119 
c. Individual Autonomy 
Public disclosure of a private fact also contributes little to indi-
vidual autonomy, because the third element, which requires the fact 
to be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, implies that 
                                                                                                             
 114 See discussion supra Section I.A. (discussing the marketplace of ideas). 
 115 Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting) (advocating for freedom to express opinions, such as using lan-
guage “intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States,” 
as opposed to publicly disclosing private facts). 
 116 See discussion supra Section I.B. (discussing participatory democracy). 
 117 491 U.S. 524, 532–37 (1989). 
 118 Id. at 536–37. 
 119 See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998). 
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publishing the fact would hinder, not advance, the autonomy of the 
plaintiff. Even if this speech marginally advances the autonomy of 
the defendant, who arguably is expressing himself or herself by pub-
lishing the fact, it diminishes the autonomy of the victim, who now 
is unable to exercise self-determination in controlling who has ac-
cess to information about his or her private life.120 In Kinsey, for 
example, although writing the letters about Kinsey’s former drug 
use may have advanced Macur’s self-expression, it diminished Kin-
sey’s autonomy by not enabling him to control whether and when 
that information would be expressed to the recipients of the let-
ters.121 
3. HARM 
Public disclosure of private fact is unprotected speech because 
its minimal free speech value is outweighed by the severe harm it 
causes.122 As discussed above, although it may slightly advance the 
autonomy of the speaker,123 it diminishes the autonomy of the indi-
vidual whom the fact is about124 and fails to contribute to the mar-
ketplace of ideas125 or advance participatory democracy.126 Yet by 
disclosing the fact, the publisher may inflict severe psychological 
harm on victims by humiliating them or damaging their reputa-
tion.127 Disclosing the fact also infringes on victims’ sense of secu-
rity by invading their privacy and diminishing their ability to control 
the release of information about themselves.128 
Because public disclosure of private fact is defined as requiring 
that the disclosure of the fact be objectionable to a reasonable per-
                                                                                                             
 120 See discussion supra Section I.C. (discussing individual autonomy). 
 121 See Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 122 See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 2. 
 123 See discussion supra Section III.A.2.c. (discussing the speaker’s autonomy 
when publicly disclosing private facts). 
 124 See id. 
 125 See discussion supra Section III.A.2.a. (discussing how public disclosure 
of private fact does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas). 
 126 See discussion supra Section III.A.2.b. (discussing how public disclosure 
of private fact does not advance participatory democracy). 
 127 M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1131 
(2011). 
 128 See Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
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son, this speech by definition inflicts harm on the person whose pri-
vacy is invaded.129 In Kinsey, the Court awarded the plaintiff dam-
ages including “mental anguish, suffering, expenses incurred in try-
ing to remove himself and his wife from Macur’s reach, and to pro-
tect his wife’s security and ensure her peace of mind.”130 Similarly, 
in Banks, the plaintiff asserted that she had “been caused to suffer 
humiliation, agony and loss of social prestige by this publicity.”131 
Both cases highlight the direct psychological harm endured from 
such a violation of privacy, as well as the embarrassment and loss 
of security that results from being unable to control the disclosure 
of private information. 
The harm is comparable to that of a Fourth Amendment privacy 
violation, an unreasonable search or seizure, in that it results from 
interference with one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.132 Inva-
sion of privacy causes a lack of personal sense of security, which 
may cause anxiety, embarrassment, or fear.133 The more privacy is 
infringed upon—the more “we might limit what we think and 
say.”134 This is because as privacy decreases, the risk that our speech 
will be made public increases, so we tailor our speech to be suitable 
for a public audience.135 Thus, it is not prohibiting speech disclosing 
private facts that risks chilling free speech, but in fact, the opposite: 
allowing privacy to be repeatedly invaded is what ultimately would 
stop people from speaking freely, thus diminishing ideas in the mar-
ketplace, hindering participatory democracy, and reducing auton-
omy. To protect future speech in furtherance of these First Amend-
ment values, private facts must be able to remain private. 
                                                                                                             
 129 See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 9 (The third element of the tort is that dis-
closing the fact would be “offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person.”). 
 130 Kinsey, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608 at 614. 
 131 Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 132 See Kaye, supra note 79, at § 9. 
 133 See Calo, supra note 127, at 1131. 
 134 Id. at 1146. 
 135 See id. 




At common law, defamation consists of the “unprivileged pub-
lication of false and defamatory statements concerning a plain-
tiff.”136 Defamation refers to two torts: libel and slander.137 If the 
false defamatory statement is written, it is libel; if oral, it is slan-
der.138 The standard for whether defamation is unprotected speech 
differs depending on whether the defamatory statements target a 
public or private figure.139 
a. Public Figure 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court changed 
the standard for defamation when the false defamatory statement 
targets public officials, rather than private figures.140 Speech defam-
ing a public official is unprotected only if it is made with “actual 
malice,” meaning that it is made with actual knowledge that the 
statement is false or with reckless disregard for its falsity.141 Without 
requiring actual malice, any time a newspaper were to make a mis-
take about a fact defaming a public figure, it would be held liable 
for damages.142 This might cause newspapers to self-censor in order 
to avoid making mistakes, chilling accurate criticism of public offi-
cials.143 Because protecting criticism of public officials is a core 
goal of the Free Speech Clause,144 the balance of free speech bene-
fits and harms is different regarding public officials: the value to the 
                                                                                                             
 136 Arien W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodat-
ing Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in 
the Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 907 (1989). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See id. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–82 (1964). 
 140 Id. at 279–80. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See id. at 271–72. 
 143 See id. (“Erroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable in free debate, 
and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing 
space’ that they ‘need to survive. . . .’”) (quoting NAACP. v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 433 (1963)). 
 144 See discussion supra Sections I.A–B. 
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marketplace of ideas and participatory democracy outweighs the 
harms, unlike in defamation of private figures.145 
The Supreme Court has expanded the Sullivan standard to apply 
not just to public officials, but also to public figures, including indi-
viduals such as a university football coach and a retired general.146 
The “actual malice” standard applies to public figures because like 
public officials, they may command a substantial amount of public 
interest, and are therefore likely to be involved in issues the public 
has a justified and important interest in.147 However, “public figure” 
has been defined narrowly, and does not include those who have 
become famous without thrusting themselves into public contro-
versy to influence others.148 
b. Private Figure 
The standard for defamation does not require actual malice for 
private individuals because the harms are greater for private figures: 
they have less access to channels of communication to rebut false 
statements about them and are therefore more vulnerable to injury 
than public figures.149 The free speech benefits of allowing defama-
tion against private figures is also lower: there is less of a concern 
about chilling free speech regarding criticism of private figures, as 
this speech contributes less to participatory democracy and the mar-
ketplace of ideas, unlike criticism of public officials.150 
If individuals become public figures because they have “thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in or-
der to influence the resolution of the issues involved,” they are a 
limited purpose public figure.151 These individuals become public 
                                                                                                             
 145 See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. 
 146 See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967). 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (holding that a scientist 
whose research on monkeys was publicly attacked was not a public figure for 
defamation purposes); see also Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 
(1979) (holding that Russian spies’ nephew, active in public affairs, was not a 
public figure because he did not voluntarily thrust himself into controversy). 
 149 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–44 (1974). 
 150 See id. at 344–45. 
 151 Id. at 345, 351–52. 
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figures for the “limited range of issues” related to those controver-
sies.152 
For example, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, a wealthy industrial 
family brought a libel suit against Time magazine for printing false 
and defamatory reports about the husband and wife’s “extramarital 
adventures” revealed during their divorce proceedings.153 Although 
the couple was well known—the Florida Supreme Court referred to 
the Firestone divorce as a “cause celebre”—the U.S. Supreme Court 
held the divorcee was not a public figure for the limited purpose of 
her divorce.154 “Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceed-
ings is not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to in Gertz, even 
though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may 
be of interest to some portion of the reading public,” the Court 
wrote.155 Although the couple was publicly known for its wealth, 
Ms. Firestone did not freely choose to publicize issues regarding her 
married life.156 Because she did not thrust her divorce into public 
controversy, the Sullivan standard did not apply to defamation about 
her divorce.157 
2. FREE SPEECH VALUE 
Defamation is unprotected speech if the defamatory false state-
ments are made negligently for private figures, or with actual malice 
for public figures, because the free speech benefits of allowing the 
speech are outweighed by the harm it causes. 
a. Marketplace of Ideas 
Although false statements are not in themselves an unprotected 
category of speech, the Supreme Court has stated: “there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact.”158 Neither intentional 
                                                                                                             
 152 Id. at 351. 
 153 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 452 (1976). 
 154 See id. at 454–55. 
 155 Id. at 454. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Contra Greenawalt, 
supra note 28 and accompanying text (“Under this theory, false ideas are useful 
because by challenging true ideas, they encourage re-examination of the truth, 
strengthening and vitalizing the truth.”). 
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nor unintentional lies contribute to society’s interest in “‘uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”159 Because 
they are not an “essential part of any exposition of ideas,” lies do 
not provide new ideas in the marketplace worthy of contemplation, 
consideration, or debate.160 Furthermore, untrue statements create a 
risk that the “‘stream of information’ will be ‘polluted’ by fal-
sity.”161 Even if false facts add some slight value to the marketplace 
of ideas—i.e., through helping discern the truth by causing true 
ideas to be re-examined in light of contradicting false ones162—
when false statements are also defamatory, the harm caused to the 
victim outweighs this minimal contribution to the marketplace. 
b. Participatory Democracy 
Defamation targeting private individuals does not contribute to 
participatory democracy because it is not about public officials, who 
receive less free speech protection than private officials.163 For pub-
lic officials, defamation is only unprotected speech if it is made with 
actual malice.164 Defamatory statements made with actual malice do 
not contribute to participatory democracy because, although they 
may be about political candidates, they are false—and therefore 
would actually create a less informed electorate, rather than a more 
informed one. There is also less concern about chilling speech that 
advances participatory democracy if the speaker is only held liable 
when he or she knows that his or her statement is false.165 
                                                                                                             
 159 Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 160 Id.; see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2557 (2012) (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (“[L]ies have no value in and of themselves, and proscribing them 
does not chill any valuable speech.”). 
 161 Langvardt, supra note 136, at 903; see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2559 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing people to falsely represent themselves 
as receiving a medal of honor from the military “debase[s] the distinctive honor 
of military awards” by damaging the reputation and meaning of the award for 
those who rightfully earn it). 
 162 See Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 130; see also discussion supra Section 
I.A. 
 163 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281–82 (1964). 
 164 Id. at 279–80. 
 165 See id. at 281–82. 
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If the defamation targets a limited public purpose figure, the 
speech is only unprotected if it is about issues the figure is not fa-
mous for.166 This speech makes little contribution to participatory 
democracy because if it is not about the issues for which the figure 
is famous, it likely does not relate to the public affairs in which they 
are involved.167 
c. Individual Autonomy 
Because defamatory statements are false, they have little value 
towards advancing self-expression.168 Moreover, even if there is 
some self-expressive value for the speaker, it hinders the autonomy 
of the subject of the defamatory statement.169 Whereas the speaker 
is arguably expressing a point of view regarding another individual, 
the defamed person now loses the ability to control his or her repu-
tation, the way he or she is perceived, and what information is pub-
licized regarding his or her character.170 
3. HARM 
While defamation makes little contribution to the marketplace 
of ideas, participatory democracy, or autonomy, it inflicts great 
harm on the person who is defamed. The harms caused by defama-
tion include both individual and community harms. Individualized 
harms include the “impairment of reputation and standing in the 
community, as well as personal humiliation, and mental anguish and 
suffering.”171 In essence, reputation is protected at the expense of 
free speech so that “good men [won’t] fall prey to foul rumor”172—
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and have to endure the subsequent psychological, emotional, and 
economic consequences from damage to one’s reputation. 
Harm caused by defamation extends beyond these personal 
harms, also encompassing harm from the community.173 This harm 
“stems from the community’s changed impressions of the defamed 
person.”174 The defamatory statement harms the reputation of the 
defamed individual so severely as to “lower him or her in the esti-
mation of the community or to deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with him or her.”175 In addition to further causing psy-
chological harm, damage to reputation can have tangible, economic 
costs for the defamed person. The harm to the person’s reputation 
may lead to him or her losing a job or having difficulty being hired 
for future jobs, causing severe economic damage. Thus, the “con-
crete reality of what happens” to those who are defamed is that 
“[t]heir lives are changed. Their standing in the community, their 
opportunities, their self-worth, their free enjoyment of life is lim-
ited.”176 
C. Child Pornography 
1. DEFINITION 
Child pornography, defined as pornographic materials featuring 
sexual conduct by children, is not protected speech under the First 
Amendment.177 For example, in New York v. Ferber, a New York 
statute prohibiting a person from knowingly distributing materials 
depicting sexual acts by a child under 16 years of age was upheld, 
finding the ban consistent with the First Amendment.178 
In defining the contours of this unprotected category of speech, 
the Ferber Court held that first, the defendant must have knowledge 
                                                                                                             
 173 Daniel Scardino, Liberty and Defamation, 20-FALL COMM. LAW. 3, 3 
(2002). 
 174 Id. 
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 176 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Vic-
tim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2376 (1989). 
 177 Liu, supra note 73, at 2. 
 178 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982). 
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of the character of the materials in order to be prosecuted for distrib-
uting them.179 Second, the Court must conduct an independent con-
stitutional review of child pornography found by lower courts to be 
unprotected speech.180 However, to be unprotected speech, child 
pornography is not required to “appeal to the prurient interest,” “be 
patently offensive,” or be “based on a consideration of the material 
as a whole.”181 Thus, “the presence of some serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific matter will not constitutionally redeem mate-
rial containing depictions of sexual conduct by children.”182 
The category, however, does not extend to include sexually ex-
plicit images that appear to depict minors, but were produced with-
out using any actual children, i.e., through computer imaging.183 
Banning virtual images of children “‘goes beyond [Ferber], which 
distinguished child pornography from other sexually explicit speech 
because of the State’s interest in protecting the children exploited by 
the production process.’”184 Thus, such images are protected speech, 
if no real children are depicted.185 Still, the requirements to fall into 
the unprotected category are minimal: all one needs to prove is that 
the material contains images of actual children engaged in sexual 
activity, the conduct is illegal by statute, and the defendant was 
aware of the character of the materials.186 
2. FREE SPEECH VALUE 
As the Supreme Court wrote in Ferber, “[t]he value of permit-
ting live performances and photographic reproductions of children 
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de 
minimus.”187 
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a. Marketplace of Ideas 
Child pornography makes minimal contribution to the market-
place of ideas because it is not communicating a fact or opinion be-
yond the sexualization of children, which has little, if any, public 
social value.188 It is “unlikely that visual depictions of children per-
forming sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often 
constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance 
or scientific or educational work.”189 Moreover, in the rare case 
where child pornography is being used to express a literary or artis-
tic idea, there are alternatives that can be used to express the mes-
sage, such as a person over the statutory age who looks younger190 
or virtual simulations of children that are not actually children.191 
In addition, whatever viewpoint is expressed through child por-
nography is not constitutionally protected because freedom of 
speech does not extend to illegal activities.192 Because child pornog-
raphy both features and likely perpetuates illegal abuse of children, 
it does not express an idea that legitimately contributes to the mar-
ketplace.193 
b. Participatory Democracy 
Child pornography does not advance participatory democracy 
because it does not relate to public officials (given that public offi-
cials are adults), public affairs, or matters of public interest. On the 
contrary, the Supreme Court in Ferber reasoned that a “democratic 
society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded 
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.”194 Because 
child pornography has been deemed unprotected speech, states can 
pass legislation banning it to protect the “physical and emotional 
well-being of youth.”195 By promoting the safety and wellbeing of 
                                                                                                             
 188 See id. at 762–63. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 763. 
 191 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239–40, 256 (2002). 
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 193 See Liu, supra note 73, at 7. 
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children, states can thereby foster future adult citizens who can en-
gage actively in their communities, contributing to participatory de-
mocracy.196 
c. Individual Autonomy 
While child pornography may marginally promote the autonomy 
of creators or distributors of child porn by allowing them to express 
themselves through this medium, it infringes on the autonomy of the 
children in the films in several ways. First, because the children are 
subjected to sexual acts, their autonomy over their own bodies is 
diminished.197 Second, being featured in child porn hinders their 
ability to express themselves, both as children and as adults, because 
the images will likely follow them through adulthood, affecting how 
they are perceived and interact with others permanently.198 Third, it 
affects their self-determination because they are too young to legally 
consent to sexual activity, and thus they are not making their own 
life decisions regarding whether or not to be featured in the film or 
photographs.199 
3. HARM 
Even if child pornography has marginal free speech benefits in 
regards to promoting the autonomy of the creator of child porn, that 
benefit is outweighed by the severe harms of protecting child por-
nography as free speech. Child pornography causes both direct harm 
to the children who are the subject of the material and indirect harm 
to all children more generally.200 
The direct harm caused by child pornography is the injury in-
flicted on the actual children in the pornographic materials: harm to 
their psychological, physical, mental, and emotional wellbeing.201 
While these harms are inflicted from the making of the child porn 
                                                                                                             
 196 See id. 
 197 See id. at 759. 
 198 See id. 
 199 See id. at 750–51 (For example, under the statute in Ferber, child pornog-
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 200 See Liu, supra note 73, at 8–9. 
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2015] NONCONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 331 
 
itself, which involves sexual abuse of the children, they are com-
pounded by the fact that the materials produced are a “permanent 
record of the children’s participation,” and the harms are “exacer-
bated by their circulation.”202 The permanence of the films suggests 
that they will continue to play a role in the children’s lives as they 
become adults, potentially preventing them from obtaining certain 
jobs or from being able to control their public image or reputation 
in adulthood. 
The indirect harm resulting from child pornography is the po-
tential harm it causes to all children because child pornography is 
often a “catalyst for pedophiles to exploit and abuse children” in the 
future.203 The advertisement, distribution, and circulation of child 
pornography fuel the market for child porn, promoting the subse-
quent infliction of harm on more children.204 As the Court in Ferber 
wrote, “the most expeditious if not the only practical method of law 
enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by impos-
ing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or oth-
erwise promoting the product.”205 
IV. REVENGE PORN AS A NEW UNPROTECTED CATEGORY 
A. Definition 
The category of unprotected speech for nonconsensual pornog-
raphy must be specifically defined in order to best balance society’s 
competing interests in protecting free speech and in protecting vic-
tims of nonconsensual porn.206 Although adult pornography gener-
ally is protected speech,207 the nonconsensual nature of revenge porn 
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First Amendment Lawsuit Challenges Arizona Criminal Law Banning Nude Im-
ages, supra note 22, child pornography and defamation laws may also be over-
broad in impeding on free speech. Nevertheless, a narrowly defined category of 
speech should be unprotected so that narrowly tailored regulations can be enacted 
in order to prevent victims from the severe harms caused by nonconsensual por-
nography. 
 207 See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 594. 
332 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:300 
 
makes it rise to the same level of offensiveness as child porn: be-
cause it is nonconsensual, distributing revenge porn inflicts greater 
harm on victims than consensual pornography, outweighing its mar-
ginal free speech value. Thus, if pornography is distributed or pub-
licized without consent, it should be considered unprotected speech. 
The unprotected category of speech for revenge porn should en-
compass both types of non-consent: images that are initially ob-
tained without consent (e.g., by hacking a victim’s cell phone), and 
those that are originally obtained with consent, usually within the 
context of an intimate relationship, and then distributed to others 
without consent (e.g., images given to a sexual partner, who then 
distributes them to seek revenge after a break up or divorce).208 
There should also be no distinction in this category of speech be-
tween public and private figures because, unlike defamation, there 
is no risk of chilling legitimate criticism of public officials by out-
lawing nonconsensual pornography.209 
1. CONSENTING TO ONE IS NOT CONSENTING TO ALL 
Critics of legislation on nonconsensual pornography often argue 
that if the initial sharing of the images was consensual—i.e., if the 
images were consensually given to an intimate partner in a trusted 
relationship—the victim thereby consented to the distributor later 
sharing such images with the world.210 Consent, however, is con-
text-specific.211 In public disclosure of private fact, the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                             
 208 See e.g., Cecil, supra note 6, at 2514–15 (explaining that a hacker stole 
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privacy is violated both when the defendant uncovers the private fact 
without the plaintiff’s consent, as well as when the plaintiff previ-
ously told the defendant the private fact, but did not consent to it 
being publicized to others.212 For instance, in Kinsey v. Macur, Kin-
sey initially told Macur some of the private facts that Macur later 
disclosed to others, and some facts Macur discovered on her own.213 
Nevertheless, the disclosure of both types of facts was still consid-
ered a violation of Kinsey’s privacy; as the court stated, the claim 
“is not so much one of total secrecy as it is the right to define one’s 
circle of intimacy.”214 The harm does not result from exposure of a 
completely secret fact, but rather from not being able to control 
when and to whom the fact is disclosed.215 
Moreover, in Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., although 
the plaintiff consented to her doctors viewing the X-ray of her pelvis 
because it fell within the context of their medical relationship, she 
did not consent to the doctors’ subsequent distribution of it to news-
papers.216 Additionally, even if an individual consents to some of 
her sexual acts being made public—i.e., sexual acts with a former 
partner, as in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc.—that 
does not mean she consents to other sexual acts being publicized.217 
As the court in Michaels wrote, “public exposure of one sexual en-
counter [does not] forever remove[] a person’s privacy interest in all 
subsequent and previous sexual encounters.”218 
Much like public disclosure of private fact, nonconsensual por-
nography is essentially the distribution of a private fact: one’s inti-
mate sexual relations and acts, which were held to constitute a set of 
private facts in Michaels.219 Thus, if public disclosure of private fact 
allows a privacy violation to be found where the victim consented 
to telling the fact to a few people, but did not consent to disclosing 
the fact to the public in general, so too should a privacy violation be 
found when revenge porn victims consent to sharing the images with 
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one person, but do not consent to sharing them with the public at 
large. 
2. NO PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE FIGURE DISTINCTION 
The reason for distinguishing between public and private figures 
in defamation is to avoid chilling accurate criticism of public fig-
ures.220 However, this concern does not apply in the revenge porn 
context. Banning nonconsensual pornography would not chill any 
criticism of policies or public affairs, as it only limits the noncon-
sensual distribution of images of sexual acts, not any false defama-
tory statement like defamation. In addition, part of the reason for 
distinguishing between public and private figures in defamation is 
that public figures face less harm because they have more access to 
effective channels of communication to rebut false facts.221 How-
ever, this reason does not apply to revenge porn because the images 
are not false facts that can be rebutted: once they are out in the open, 
they are permanently on the Internet, essentially creating a perma-
nent record of the individuals’ role in nonconsensual pornography, 
much like child pornography.222 Like public disclosure of private 
fact, there is no falsity to disprove,223 but rather, a disclosure of in-
timacy that cannot be undone. 
Furthermore, for defamation, individuals may be considered 
public figures if they have “thrust themselves to the forefront of par-
ticular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of 
the issues involved.”224 This makes them limited purpose public fig-
ures, meaning they are only considered public figures for a limited 
range of issues connected to those controversies.225 By the very na-
ture of the fact that revenge porn is nonconsensual, it was not inten-
tionally thrust into the public eye by the victim.226 
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Even if pornography is within the range of controversies for 
which individuals are public, i.e., if they were famous for other sex-
ual acts or had previously been seen nude in other contexts, being 
famous for their sexuality does not mean they made themselves pub-
lic figures for this particular sex act.227 Just as in Michaels, where 
the court held that Pamela Anderson Lee’s sex tape was private de-
spite the fact that she was famous in part for her role in previous sex 
tapes, being famous for one’s sexuality does not mean consenting to 
a particular sex act being publicized.228 Thus, the public-private fig-
ure distinction in defamation should not apply to nonconsensual por-
nography because, unlike banning defamation, banning revenge 
porn does not risk chilling political speech. 
B. Free Speech Value 
Parallel to public disclosure of private fact, defamation, and 
child pornography, nonconsensual pornography has very few free 
speech benefits: it only marginally, if at all, contributes to the mar-
ketplace of ideas, it does not advance participatory democracy, and 
although it may have some slight self-expressive benefit to the dis-
tributor, it infringes on the autonomy of the victim. Like each of the 
other three categories, the significant harms of revenge porn out-
weigh any slight free speech value it has, and its harms mirror the 
harms long recognized by well-established unprotected classes of 
speech. 
1. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Whether speech is an exposition of ideas does not depend on 
whether the materials contain an “implicit ideology,” but instead, on 
what the speaker’s purpose is and how the message is communi-
cated.229 Just as fighting words, for instance, are said to harm, rather 
than to express an idea,230 nonconsensual pornography is distributed 
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to shame, to embarrass, or to seek revenge—not to contribute an 
idea to the marketplace.231 As the sponsor of the Florida nonconsen-
sual pornography bill, Representative Tom Goodson said, “there is 
no purpose . . . for anyone to do this, other than for harassment, ha-
tred or to hurt people, and it has driven some people to suicide.”232 
Moreover, like public disclosure of private fact, nonconsensual 
pornography does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas because 
it is not of “legitimate public concern,” meaning it is not “newswor-
thy.”233 Under the California test for newsworthiness, for example, 
nonconsensual pornography is not newsworthy because it has mini-
mal social value, encroaches greatly on private affairs, and the vic-
tim did not consent to the relevant position of public fame. 234 Fur-
thermore, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts test, it is not of 
legitimate public concern because a reasonable person would find 
publicizing one’s sexual acts without their consent “so indecent as 
to exceed the promulgation of information to which the community 
is entitled,”235 as nothing could be more intimate or private. 
In addition, like public disclosure of private fact, nonconsensual 
pornography generally does not contribute to the discovery of any 
truth pertinent to the public interest—artistic, literary, academic, or 
political.236 Yet, even in the rare situation in which nonconsensual 
pornography might have some artistic, literary, or political value, 
similar to child pornography, there are alternative means to achieve 
that value. For instance, just as there are alternatives to child por-
nography, such as using adults who look young or virtual chil-
dren,237 alternatives here include adult consensual pornography, ac-
tors, or virtual simulations depicting nonconsensual pornography. 
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2. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
Like defamation targeting private individuals, nonconsensual 
pornography does not advance participatory democracy because it 
does not relate to public affairs or political officials. Even if the vic-
tim of nonconsensual pornography is a public figure, unlike defa-
mation, it still does not contribute to “uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open debate on public issues”238 because the subject matter of non-
consensual pornography is private. Although the sex tape in 
Michaels, for instance, featured public figures, it still did not con-
tribute to participatory democracy because the content of the tape 
involved a private matter.239 Even if the content of nonconsensual 
pornography “may be of interest to some portion of the . . . public,” 
like the divorce in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, private sexual acts are 
“not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to in Gertz.”240 
In cases where nonconsensual pornography may be politically 
relevant, such as news on trafficking, art, or discussion of reproduc-
tive rights, nonconsensual pornographic images do not need to be 
shown in order to advance democracy. For example, although in 
Banks, the medical malpractice issue was a legitimate public con-
cern, the image of the intimate details of the plaintiff’s body did not 
need to be exposed to the public in order to discuss the medical mal-
practice problem.241 Likewise, just as in child pornography, there 
are alternatives for disseminating nonconsensual pornography, such 
as showing only consensual images.242 
Moreover, like in Ferber, where the Court reasoned that child 
pornography should be unprotected speech because democracy rests 
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on the “healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full ma-
turity as citizens,”243 so too is democracy advanced by its citizens 
feeling safe and secure in their communities.244 If invasions of pri-
vacy—such as images of individuals’ private sex lives being pub-
lished online without their consent, and without recourse—continu-
ously take place, it is unlikely this sense of security will be achieved, 
just as if public disclosures of private fact were not prevented.245 
3. INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
Like public disclosure of private fact, defamation, and child por-
nography, even if nonconsensual pornography contributes margin-
ally to the autonomy of nonconsensual pornography disseminators 
by allowing them to express themselves by distributing the pornog-
raphy, it diminishes the autonomy of victims. Just as public disclo-
sure of private fact hinders plaintiffs’ self-determination because 
they are unable to control who has access to information about their 
private lives, nonconsensual pornography infringes on self-determi-
nation because revenge porn victims cannot control who sees private 
images of their bodies.246 Moreover, just as defamatory statements 
further hinder victims’ self-determination because they lose the abil-
ity to control their reputation and what information is published 
about them, nonconsensual pornography prevents victims from be-
ing able to control their reputation or make their own decisions re-
garding whether or not to display their private sex acts.247 
In addition to impeding on victims’ self-determination, noncon-
sensual pornography also hinders self-expression because it impacts 
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how victims interact with others by damaging victims’ psychologi-
cal and emotional wellbeing.248 It also hinders self-expression be-
cause it changes how others perceive victims, causing their mes-
sages to be interpreted differently.249 Because once nonconsensual 
pornography is posted, similar to child pornography, it is perma-
nently on the Internet,250 it will affect how victims interact with oth-
ers for the foreseeable future. 
C. Harm 
Like child pornography, the severe harm caused by nonconsen-
sual pornography can be categorized as direct and indirect harm.251 
Direct harm refers to the injury inflicted on the actual individuals in 
the nonconsensual pornographic materials.252 Similar to the harms 
caused by defamation, these harms can further be classified as indi-
vidualized harms and harms from the community.253 The former, in-
dividualized harm, includes damage to victims’ psychological and 
emotional wellbeing.254 The latter, harm from the community, in-
cludes the damage to victims’ reputation and standing in the com-
munity, and resulting economic loss.255 In contrast, indirect harm 
refers to harm inflicted on others who are not featured in the specific 
pornographic materials.256 This includes future victims of noncon-
sensual pornography—which there will be more of if this speech is 
protected—and women in general, as revenge porn “affects women 
and girls far more frequently than men and boys, and creates far 
                                                                                                             
 248 See discussion infra Section IV.C.1.a. (discussing the harms nonconsen-
sual pornography causes to individuals). 
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 251 See Liu, supra note 73, at 8–9. 
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pornography). 
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 254 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367 (1974). 
 255 See Scardino, supra note 173, at 3. 
 256 See Liu, supra note 73, at 9. 
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more serious consequences for them,”257 thus perpetuating gender 
inequality if this speech is protected.258 
1. DIRECT HARM 
a. Individual Harms: Psychological & Emotional Damage 
Just as public disclosure of private fact may cause mental an-
guish and humiliation because a private detail of one’s life is dis-
closed without his or her consent,259 the distribution of revenge porn 
also can cause severe psychological and emotional harm to victims, 
as their intimate sexual acts are publicized without their consent. 
According to one study, ninety-three percent of victims said they 
suffered “significant emotional distress due to being a victim” of 
nonconsensual pornography.260 
The psychological harm caused by nonconsensual pornography 
stems not just from the invasion of privacy,261 but also from fear of 
the consequences of revenge porn: nonconsensual pornography 
raises the risk of stalking and physical attack because victims’ 
names and contact information often appear next to their nude im-
ages.262 “In a study of 1,244 individuals, over 50% of victims re-
ported that their naked photos appeared next to their full name and 
social network profile; over 20% of victims reported that their e-
mail addresses and telephone numbers appeared next to their naked 
                                                                                                             
 257 Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 348. There is a disparate impact on 
women who are victims of revenge porn both because women are more frequently 
victims of nonconsensual porn and because of a societal tendency to trivialize 
crimes that primarily affect women and girls, including domestic violence, sexual 
assault, and sexual harassment. See id.; see also Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Ex-
pressive Value in Combatting Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 
384–85 (2009) (discussing cyber harassment’s disparate impact on women); see 
also Mary Anne Franks, How to Feel like a Woman, or Why Punishment is a 
Drag, 61 UCLA L. REV. 566, 583 (2014) (noting resistance to treat crimes that 
disproportionately affect women, e.g., sexual abuse and harassment, seriously). 
 258 See Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 348–49. 
 259 See Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); see 
also Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). 
 260 Revenge Porn by the Numbers, ENDREVENGEPORN.COM (Jan. 3, 2014), 
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/revenge-porn-infographic/. 
 261 See Calo, supra note 127, at 1131. 
 262 Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 350–51. 
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photos.”263 Fear that this raises risk of harm is not just paranoia, but 
reality: forty-nine percent of victims in a Cyber Civil Rights Initia-
tive study said they have been harassed or stalked online by people 
who viewed their material.264 As a result of this risk, many victims 
struggle with anxiety, suffer from panic attacks, and fear leaving 
their homes, all of which make it difficult to complete their work.265 
For instance, Hollie Toups, a thirty-three-year-old teacher’s aide 
in Texas, suffered psychological consequences ranging from humil-
iation to fear when she found several topless photos of herself pub-
lished on Texxxan.com, posted alongside links to her Facebook and 
Twitter accounts, a Google map of her whereabouts, and numerous 
comments.266 Although she had taken these photos for an ex-boy-
friend nearly ten years ago, a hacker stole them from her phone and 
posted them online.267 After a friend called to alert her about the 
images, she “was in tears for days.”268 She was afraid to leave her 
house, and when she finally did, she was approached multiple times 
by men who had seen her photographs online.269 She stated that she 
“could not catch [her] breath,” and that she “was on the verge of a 
panic attack.”270 
Similarly, for over a year after English professor Annmarie Chi-
arini’s ex-boyfriend auctioned nude images of her on eBay without 
her consent, she suffered from panic attacks and severe anxiety.271 
She described her experience: 
I would wake up at 3[ ]am and check my email, my 
Facebook page, eBay, then Google my name, a ritual 
I performed three times before I could settle back 
down. In September 2011, I was thrown into panic 
                                                                                                             
 263 See id. 
 264 Revenge Porn by the Numbers, supra note 260. 
 265 See Citron & Franks, supra note 7, at 351 (citing a study conducted by the 
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative showing that over eighty percent of victims of non-
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 271 See Chiarini, supra note 6. 
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again after I read an anonymous email alerting me to 
an online profile that featured nude pictures of me. I 
Googled my name, and there I was, on a porn web-
site. The profile included my full name, the city and 
state where I live, the name of the college where I 
teach and the campus. There was a solicitation – 
HOT FOR TEACHER? WELL, COME GET IT! 
The site had been up for 14 days and had been viewed 
over 3,000 times.272 
Like child pornography, these harms are compounded by the fact 
that once online, there is a permanent record of victims’ involve-
ment in nonconsensual pornography, which is often widely circu-
lated, as it was for Chiarini.273 The permanence of Internet posts 
makes the risk to victims’ physical wellbeing and the resulting psy-
chological consequences long-lasting, as the risk continues for as 
long as the materials are online. Because Chiarini was too scared to 
leave her house for a prolonged period of time, her therapist insisted 
she go on medical leave from work.274 However, a senior adminis-
trator at the college she worked for denied her request for medical 
leave, claiming that she “perpetrated the incident.”275 Chiarini 
feared for her job and felt that “[b]ecause of the permanence of the 
[I]nternet, and lack of legislation, [her] torture was never going to 
end.”276 As a result, that night she attempted suicide.277 
Although Chiarini fortunately survived her attempted suicide, 
the permanence of nonconsensual pornography exacerbated her psy-
chological harm because it instilled the feeling that the humiliation, 
pain, and anxiety would never go away.278 The permanence of non-
consensual pornography also exacerbates the community harms 
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 273 Id.; Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (the fact that child 
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(discussed below) because long-lasting psychological harm pre-
vents victims from doing their jobs279—as it did for Chiarini.280 In 
addition, the permanence of Internet posts increases the chance that 
one’s community will discover the existence of the pornography, 
which raises the likelihood that victims’ reputations will suffer. 
b. Community Harms: Reputation & Economic Loss 
Like defamation, the harm caused by nonconsensual pornogra-
phy encompasses not only individual physical and psychological 
harm, but also community harm, which results from the commu-
nity’s changed impression of the victim.281 Once nonconsensual 
pornography is posted, Internet searches of individuals’ names will 
often display their naked image or video.282 Thus, victims’ commu-
nities will often quickly become aware of their presence in revenge 
porn and hold victims in lower esteem or “deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with [them].”283 
In addition to worsening psychological harms, this change in 
reputation can cause severe economic loss. Some victims have been 
fired from their jobs for appearing in nude pictures online; others 
have been unable to find work at all.284 For instance, an Ohio teacher 
was placed on paid leave after a nude photo of her was posted on a 
revenge porn web site.285 A government agency fired a woman after 
a co-worker distributed a naked picture of her to colleagues.286 Holly 
Jacobs, a 29-year-old Florida PhD student, had to legally change her 
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name to find relief after her ex-boyfriend leaked sexually explicit 
videos and images of her online.287 
Economic costs are particularly great because most employers 
use the Internet to screen candidates based on their online reputa-
tions, searching job applicants’ names on search engines.288 If sex-
ually explicit images of individuals come up, 
[r]ecruiters do not contact victims to see if they 
posted nude photos of themselves or if someone else 
did in violation of their trust. The ‘simple but regret-
table truth is that after consulting search results, em-
ployers don’t call revenge porn victims to schedule 
interviews or to extend offers. Employers do not 
want to hire individuals whose search results might 
reflect poorly on the employer.289 
2. INDIRECT HARM 
a. Harm to Future Victims 
In Ferber, the Court reasoned that the distribution network for 
child pornography must be closed if the production material, which 
requires the sexual exploitation of children, is to be effectively con-
trolled.290 Similarly, the distribution of nonconsensual pornography 
must also be controlled to reduce demand for this type of pornogra-
phy. Unlike child pornography, however, revenge porn is often not 
distributed for profit, but rather, to embarrass or shame the victim.291 
                                                                                                             
 287 Beth Stebner, ‘I’m Tired of Hiding’: Revenge-Porn Victim Speaks Out 
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Nevertheless, without finding this speech unprotected, future vic-
tims will continue to be harmed by revenge porn. 
Moreover, although child pornography promotes illegal activ-
ity—child abuse—and nonconsensual pornography does not neces-
sarily involve an illegal act, it may be used as a tool for crimes such 
as domestic violence and human trafficking.292 The images them-
selves are often taken as a result of an abuser’s force, and abusers 
often threaten to disclose the images if victims try to escape from 
the abusive relationship.293 Thus, allowing nonconsensual pornog-
raphy—like child pornography—may enable the perpetration of fu-
ture crimes, inflicting harm on future victims. 
b. Harm to Women in General 
While men may be victims of nonconsensual pornography, the 
vast majority of victims are women.294 Although significant prog-
ress has been made toward gender equality, the failure to take issues 
that predominantly affect women seriously—such as domestic vio-
lence, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and now nonconsensual 
pornography—perpetuates unequal treatment of women.295 This is 
particularly true where the law recognizes an analogous issue, but 
the analogous crime traditionally affects men. 
For instance, courts have long recognized the harms resulting 
from defamation: it changes victims’ “standing in the community, 
their opportunities, their self-worth, [and] their free enjoyment of 
life.”296 For courts to see these harms of defamation, “and yet to fail 
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to see that the very same things happen to the victims of [revenge 
porn], is selective vision.”297 The law is treating like harms unalike: 
it is providing a remedy for people facing these harms when they are 
caused by an act that historically affects men (defamation), while 
leaving no recourse for victims enduring the same harms when the 
act predominantly affects women (revenge porn).298 How many 
women like Chiarini need to attempt suicide before it becomes clear 
that the harm nonconsensual pornography inflicts on women paral-
lels—if not exceeds—the harm defamation inflicts on men? Why is 
it that when a man is accused of being a communist, he can bring 
suit against the publisher for defaming his character—damaging his 
reputation and creating risk of economic loss;299 yet, when a woman 
sues a man for publishing nude photos of her on Twitter and sending 
them to her employer—causing the same damage to her reputation 
and risk of economic loss—her case is automatically dismissed?300 
CONCLUSION 
Nonconsensual pornography should not be protected speech un-
der the First Amendment because the severe harms—indirect and 
especially direct—strongly outweigh the marginal free speech ben-
efits. Although preserving freedom of speech is critical to advancing 
the marketplace of ideas, strengthening participatory democracy, 
and fostering self-expression and determination, categorization—
treating different forms of speech differently—does not necessarily 
undermine these goals.301 As Frederick Schauer has argued, having 
fewer, broader categories of unprotected speech is less likely to pro-
tect free speech than having more, narrowly defined categories that 
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are less vague and malleable.302 Thus, creating a new category for 
nonconsensual pornography can protect victims from the significant 
harms it causes, without diluting an existing category of speech or 
infringing upon the core free speech values. 
Moreover, finding nonconsensual pornography to be unpro-
tected speech is critical to providing a legal remedy for revenge porn 
victims. Without doing so, failure to provide recourse in the law 
causes a second injury to victims—”the pain of knowing that the 
government provides no remedy, and offers no recognition of the 
dehumanizing experience that victims . . . are subjected to.”303 Non-
consensual pornography causes real harm. “When the legal system 
offers no redress for that real harm, it perpetuates [it].”304 
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